


東京外国語大学 国際日本学研究プログラム—文部科学省「国立大学の機能強化」事業—

TUFS Program for Japan Studies in Global Context,
supported by Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology(MEXT)

東京外国語大学 国際日本学研究 報告Ⅱ

クリストファー・ガーティス (ロンドン大学 SOAS)

Christopher Gerteis (SOAS, University of London)
in TUFS, 2016-2017




東京外国語大学 大学院
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Young and Radical in Postwar Japan

Christopher Gerteis

SOAS, University of London

This project examines the global connections, and disconnections, that fostered a globally mobile class of young Japanese radicals during the last four decades of the twentieth century. The aim is to understand how an influential minority of young working-class Japanese who experienced unprecedented high standards of living, educational attainment, and leisure time and yet nevertheless elected to fire a gun, throw a grenade, or gas a subway in advocacy for a religious or political movement. Importantly, there is a larger social question at work here in that despite clear global convergences of modernity, youth, and radical politics scholars have yet to construct a historically informed interpretive framework for discussing this transnational and perhaps trans-epochal phenomenon. Not all political violence is born of religious fervor, and not all young radicals are of Middle Eastern descent. The highly industrialized societies of Europe, the Americas and Pacific Asia have generated a significant share of the world's angry youth whether they be Islamic extremists, Communist revolutionaries or Neo-Fascist thugs. By looking at Japan there is the potential to better understand the globality of youth radicalism in a historical context that moves beyond the contemporary obsession with Islamic fundamentalism.

Many Europeans and Americans, and most Japanese for that matter, naïvely think of the Japanese after 1945 as politically passive and unlikely to become directly involved in radical politics. Yet the late twentieth century is demarcated by significant points when normal, everyday Japanese people individually and collectively took direct, radical political action – from the 17-year old who assassinated the president of the Japan Socialist Party in 1960 to the 18 million youth who took to the streets, occupied their schools and universities, and besieged parliament to demonstrate their opposition to Japan's involvement in the Vietnam War in 1968. Indeed, small bands of dedicated young radicals have pushed and prodded the Japanese state since the 1850s. From the assassinations committed by the Isshin-shishi ('Men of High Purpose') of the 1850s and 1860s to the young fascists who launched a string of unsuccessful coup d'états during the 1930s to the hijackings and airport attacks by leftist terror groups during the 1970s and 1980s, the apparent political status quo of contemporary Japan is in no small way the result of a century and a half of sporadic eruptions of political violence perpetrated by young Japanese men and women.

While it is unfortunate that non-specialists often overlook the growing base of studies of popular

political opposition in modern Japan, more important is that scholars of modern Japan have still paid insufficient attention to the impact of gender, generation and class differentiations in the ways that extremist politics also shaped the political contours of twentieth century Japan. This history of radical youth politics in postwar Japan enables a better understanding of radicalized youth within the context of the global idea flows that precipitated a peculiar confluence of Mao-ism, black nationalism and Palestinian liberation in young leftists' re-interpretations of Marx-Leninism in the late 1960s and early 1970s; the neo-Fascist iconographies, and political associations, of mobsters and motorcycle youth gangs of the 1980s; and the trans-national religious *mélange* at the center of terror attacks perpetrated by the *Aum Shinrikyo* cult in the mid-1990s.

Politicians and bureaucrats navigated their shared interest in the social welfare of young people alongside their fear that young people also constituted a serious threat to social stability. From the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, the Japanese state responded to youth radicalism with measured amounts of co-option and repression, but the constitutional democracy from the mid-twentieth century limited the extent to which the state could deploy its customary toolbox of suppressive tactics while simultaneously imbuing young people with specific inalienable rights. No longer children, but not yet fully emancipated adults, young people in postwar Japan learned to express their subjectivity during an intense period of successive cultural movements and political crises that ran parallel to the experiences of young people in the highly-industrialized nations of Western Europe and the Americas.

The Japanese state responded to its 'youth problem' with formal and informal modes of suppression that included selective intimidation and even the recruitment of underworld groups with strong ties to right-wing parties who, with American backing, enthusiastically allied with a select group of neo-nationalists and neo-fascists, as they 'struck back' at 'Communist insurgencies' first thought born in the Soviet Union, then believed to be fomented by the People's Republic of China, and finally thought to be controlled by North Korea. Their success at knocking out leftist youth groups in Japan, and corresponding indirect encouragement of neo-nationalist agendas, was such that by the end of the 1990s most Japanese had come to believe that youth radicalism was a thing of the past.

In recovering the narrative of radical politics in which Japanese youth participated this book examines the political discourses produced by and for young blue-collar men and women – from the weekly rants found in the sports, gambling, pornography and politics magazine *Shūkan Taishū* (*Weekly Masses*) to the political subject embedded within the comic book series *Kyōtei Shōjo* (*Motorboat Racer Girl*). Analyzed alongside diplomatic, police and intelligence reports collected from the national archives of Japan, Great Britain and the United States as well as ephemera gleaned from the archives of the Takazawa Collection at the University of Hawai'i in Manoa and the Ōhara Institute for

Social Research at Hōsei University in Tokyo, these sources offer a unique means of moving beyond methodological nationalism by investigating Japan as a conjunction point for the global flow of ideas and peoples that shaped the Cold War world, and defined the late twentieth century.

By focusing specifically on young radicals of blue-collar origins, this book breaks from conventional studies of Japanese youth and political violence that have tended to blame the *ennui* of affluence for several waves of youth radicalism since 1960. High-profile acts of political violence committed by young Japanese of blue-collar origins illustrate that social alienation in a highly industrialized society, such as Japan, is born of a complex interchange of material, social, political and psychological conditions. This book argues that the severity and social impact of these acts of political violence also had the inadvertent effect of lending credibility to further levels of social and legal repression that did not redress the extent to which some young people were push/pulled to acts of religio-political extremism, but instead precipitated further levels of social alienation that enhanced the attraction of violence. This book concludes by examining the extent to which severely diminished employment, educational, and training opportunities for youth aged 16 to 24 has since the 1990s combined with intensified levels of social repression of ‘odd youth’ to trigger high rates of atomized (non-collective) anti-social behaviors informed by video games, animated films, and comic book series with extreme political themes. Indeed, the Japanese state’s successful suppression of heterodox religious and political movements helped to foster an involution of violence that manifested in a subset of youth who expressed their anger inward as violence against themselves, their family, or their classmates.¹

Studies of youth and youth politics in modern Japan, and global youth politics from the 1960s to the 1980s generally, overlook the extent to which young blue-collar men and women participated in radical political movements, right- and left-wing, all through the postwar era.² Many politicians and

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- 1 Vogel, S.H., Vogel, S.K., 2013. *The Japanese family in transition: from the professional housewife ideal to the dilemmas of choice*. Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, MD.; and Krieg, A., Dickie, J.R., 2013. Attachment and hikikomori: a psychosocial developmental model. *Int J Soc Psychiatry* 59, 61–72. doi:10.1177/0020764011423182.
- 2 Massey, J.A., 1975. *Youth and politics in Japan*. Lexington Books, Lexington, Mass.; Ambaras, D.R., 2006. *Bad youth: juvenile delinquency and the politics of everyday life in modern Japan*. University of California Press, Berkeley.; Avenell, S.A., 2010. *Making Japanese citizens civil society and the mythology of the Shimin in postwar Japan*. University of California Press, Berkeley, Calif.; London.; Yoder, R.S., 2004. *Youth deviance in Japan: class reproduction and non-conformity*. Trans Pacific, Melbourne, Vic.; Cassegård, C., 2013. *Youth movements, trauma and alternative space in contemporary Japan*. Leiden:Global Oriental, 2014.; Marotti, W.A., 2013. *Money, trains, and guillotines: art and revolution in 1960s Japan*. Duke University Press, Durham and London., 小熊英二, 渦岡謙一, 高橋直樹, 2009. *1968*. 新曜社, 東京, Oguma, E., 2015. *Japan's 1968: A Collective Reaction to Rapid Economic Growth in an Age of Turmoil*; Ross, K., 2002. *May '68 and its afterlives*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.; Kurlansky, M., 2004. *1968: the year that rocked the world*. Ballantine, New York.; Berger, D., 2010. *The hidden 1970s histories of radicalism*. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, N.J.; Gildea, R., Mark, J., Warring, A., 2013. *Europe's 1968 voices of revolt*. Oxford University Press.

pundits assert that radical youth politics in Japan died-out during the 1980s, but their assertions belie the extent to which right-wing hate groups and fringe religio-political movements continued to attract young people well into the 1990s.³ Recent studies of Japan after the 2011 earthquake and tsunami investigate a rise in youth activism in apparent opposition to the rightward turn of the Japanese state within the context of decreasing social and economic opportunity.⁴ Other recent scholarship suggests that the scarcity of work and educational opportunities since the end of the 1990s has created a generationally stratified precariat comprised of the first Japanese since 1945 to face the prospects of a lifetime of diminishing opportunity and economic disadvantage.⁵ Neither recent trend in youth studies looks closely at the ways in which class and gender have impacted the choice by different age cohorts to join radical groups and or engage in political violence.

3 Metraux, D.A., 1999. *Aum Shinrikyo and Japanese youth*. University Press of America, Lanham, Md.; Reader, I., 2000. *Religious violence in contemporary Japan the case of Aum Shinrikyo*. University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu.

4 Slater, D.H., Keiko, N., Kindstrand, L., 2012. Social Media, Information and Political Activism in Japan's 3.11 Crisis.

5 David Slater, S.U. and P.W.G., 2011. Re-Narrating Social Class and Masculinity in Neoliberal Japan: An examination of the media coverage of the "Akihabara Incident" of 2008 <http://www.japanesestudies.org.uk/articles/2011/SlaterGalbraith.html> (accessed 12.30.15). ; and Allison, A., 2013. *Precarious Japan*. Duke University Press, Durham.

The Nexus of Gender, Class and Generation

Christopher GERTEIS
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This paper sets the stage for a longer study of how the leaders of Japan's postwar labor unions – themselves young radicals during the 1920s and 1930s – sought to harness the young blue-collar radicals who, alienated from union authorized political struggles of the Old Left, chose to join in the New Left movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s. In my earlier work I argue that during the early decades of the postwar era, public and private institutions constructed social roles for blue-collar men that augured the reemergence of a common set of gender practices legitimizing the subordination of women to men and the dominance of some men over others. The resultant hegemonic masculine ideal for the blue-collar “working man” was nonetheless ideologically flexible: labor leaders found it useful as a means of mobilizing union militancy, corporate managers were able to deploy it to quell union militancy, and the state found it a useful symbol of Japan's economic success. By the mid-1960s, work had become the measure of citizenship, employment synonymous with manhood, and Japanese men the breadwinners of postwar society.

My current research examines the extent to which the socially constructed aspects of gender identity influenced the economic and political choices made by two generations of blue-collar Japanese, born in the 1920s and 1940s, during the high-growth 1960s. Blue-collar workers formed the economic base of Japan's greatly expanded middle-class all through the 1970s and 1980s. Indeed, Japan's period of high economic growth from the mid-1960s to the late-1980s brought better wages overall, and even took Japan to the brink of becoming the largest economy in the world. That said, higher wages for Japan's blue-collar workers were not the result of the *noblesse oblige* of corporate managers, but were instead won by nearly two decades of intense union militancy that by the early 1960s saw successive years of five to six percent wage increases for the majority of Japan's unionized full-time blue-collar workers. The fulcrum of their success was the ability of socialist labor leaders to leverage their influence over nearly 6 million workers and coordinate annual pattern-bargaining struggles to pressure the majority of private and public sector employers to accede to their wage demands (Gerteis 2009, 65-91).

Much to the surprise of the leaders of the dominant socialist labor federation *Nihon Sōhyō*

Gikai (Sōhyō), whose focus on achieving higher worker's wages was a means to achieving a socialist victory in parliament, increasing standards of living for Japan's blue-collar workers led to a significant change in workers' aspirations. By the mid-1970s the majority of blue-collar Japanese, young and old, increasingly expressed to union interviewers that they were much more interested in achieving material prosperity through car ownership and ski vacation than by winning a socialist victory in parliament. Although not terribly surprising to the external observer, the shift in focus nevertheless made it increasingly difficult for union leaders to garner the support of the rank-and-file. But perhaps more significantly the shift in material circumstances and worker mentalité also contributed to a generational schism as younger men and women increasingly rejected the hegemonic masculine 'family man' and 'housewife' ideal-type gender identities that the labor movement had made front and center of their mobilization campaigns during the 1950s and 1960s (Gerteis 2009).

By analyzing the ways in which middle-aged male leaders of Japan's largest labor unions perceived politically active, young blue-collar men and women, I aim to show how generational conflict influenced the ways in which an increasing number of blue-collar men of all ages identified with middle-class cultural and economic forms. One result was the fracturing of the Old Left's monopoly on class-based ideals of masculinity, which set the stage for a cascade of class and gender confusions that have shaped popular notions of "work" and "manhood" to the present day.

The sometimes violent confrontations between labor and management that characterized labor relations during the late 1940s and 1950s contributed to the creation of a postwar wage system premised on the notion that a blue-collar man was the sole breadwinner for his family, and set the stage for the increased standards of living that accompanied double-digit economic growth in the 1960s (Kumazawa 1996, 52; Gordon 1998, 163-168). Developing alongside similar wage systems for white-collar workers, the blue-collar age- and seniority-based wage system can be seen as one cause for young blue-collar men becoming alienated from their predominantly left-led labor union, because it left them lesser paid, despite individual skill and ability, and hierarchically subordinate to the older generation of male workers.

The socialist labor movement, which represented the majority of wage-earning men and women until the late 1980s, was no stranger to the use of gender norms as a means of mobilizing the Japanese working class. Labor propaganda had deployed gendered tropes since the early twentieth century, but the material basis for the postwar labor movement's reconstruction of customary gender roles fully emerged in the early 1950s (Gerteis 2007, 2009, 2014). The Densan Wage System, named for the Electrical Utility Workers' Union (*Nihon Denki Sangyō Rōdō Kumiai Rengō Kyōgikai*, or *Densan*), which created it in the late 1940s, quickly became the basis upon which the socialist General Council of Trade Unions (*Nihon Rōdō Kumiai Sōhyōgikai*, or *Sōhyō*), a national federation of unions representing

approximately six million wage earners, assessed target wages for the pattern bargaining campaigns that consisted of contract negotiations between an industry-wide union and one employer during which the union focused all its resources on winning a favorable contract from that employer and then used the conflict and resultant agreement as a precedent to demand similar contracts from additional employers not otherwise bound by the original agreement. By the mid-1950s, Densan had won several contracts that assessed worker wages based on the real cost of living as calculated by the union, not the government or management (Nihon Rōdō Kumiai Sōhyōgikai 1964, 362-373).

A radical reconceptualization of the purpose of the workplace itself, the Densan Wage System ignored corporate profit (not a particularly pressing issue for a publicly owned utility) and privileged need by emphasizing that the purpose of work was to enable a worker to live the minimum cultured life guaranteed by Article 25 of the 1947 Constitution of Japan. The Densan “market-basket” wage system established base wages based on the actual cost of food staples, housing, transportation, and medical care. Created to suit the needs of a majority male workforce, it was built on the premise that a male wage earner headed each worker household. By adopting the Densan market-basket ideal, Sōhyō promoted the demand for a family-centered wage for all Sōhyō workers. This resulted in a federation-wide wage system that privileged the male breadwinner as the economic goal central to union activism.

In the mid-1950s, Sōhyō secretary-general Ōta Kaoru institutionalized the market-basket system by incorporating its premise that a workers’ wages supported a wife and children at home into the way Sōhyō determined the base wage demanded during the annual Spring Wage Offensive (Shuntō). The Shuntō were jointly coordinated campaigns in which public and private sector unions collaborated in a series of direct actions in support of large-scale pattern bargaining for minimum increases in base wages. Both private and public railway unions played a central role in the success of the Shuntō because their ability to shut down the transportation nexus on command was crucial to Sōhyō’s ability to engage in pattern bargaining with public and private officials. The Spring Wage Offensive provided a powerful, coordinated structure within which both private and public sector unions could ensure incremental wage increases during the high-speed double-digit growth of the 1960s, and it consequently dominated the collective bargaining arena until the late 1990s (Kume 1998, 73-106; Weathers 2008, 177-197).

With the launch of the first nationally coordinated Shuntō in 1956, the concept of a family wage gained hold through the federation’s demand for base wages determined by the needs of a male worker’s family implicit in the market-basket wage demanded by Densan in the early 1950s. At the heart of this system lay the fundamental assumption that women’s wage-earning work merely supplemented the income of the male wage earner who presumably headed the Japanese household. What motivated workers belonging to Sōhyō-affiliated unions to join

strikes coordinated by *Sōhyō*, even when their own unions had already reached a settlement with management, was the dream of a base wage that allowed a working man to support his family (Nihon Rōdō Kumiai Sōhyōgikai 1964, 362-373; Tōkyō Chihō Rōdō Kumiai Hyōgikai 1980, 491-511).

All through the 1950s and 1960s, nationally coordinated strike actions won contracts granting aggregate base-percentage increases in workers' wages worked which resulted in aggregate hourly wages nearly doubling for all wage earners between 1955 and 1965. However, wage gains were not distributed equally. Women certainly bore the worst of this burden in the form of lower wages overall, but the wage gap between male blue-collar workers aged 20–24 and 30–34 also widened to 38 percent (Ōmachi 1964, 65-73; Nihon Tōkei Kyōkai 1975, 398-99). Later, the wage gap between male workers aged 20–24 and 30–34 narrowed to 34 percent from 1965 to 1975, while the wage gap for the cohort of men who were 30–34 years in 1975 (and in their early twenties in 1965) and men of the age cohort ten years older (40–44 years) also narrowed slightly to 12 percent, indicating a general flattening of age-based wage disparities that appeared to bode well for the wage-earning prospects of blue-collar men belonging to younger age cohorts. Although younger men still made two-thirds of that earned by older male co-workers, the difference was not as great as it had been just ten years previous. Indeed, men aged 20-24 holding manufacturing jobs earned 68 percent of the wages earned by men aged 30-34, while transportation and communication sector workers earned 71 percent. Male utility workers aged 20-24 earned 64 percent, and male service sector workers, which included government employees and teachers, 65 percent. (Nihon Tōkei Kyōkai 1975, 70-75, 398-99).

Blue-collar men were doing well, and union leaders heavily invested in schemes promoting social roles for blue-collar men that defined manliness in terms of work and wages as a means encouraging a distinct political agenda. Social expectations that a “real man” worked for his family increasingly became the norm. Yet many young men had reported to union officials a decade earlier their dismay that even by the age of thirty they did not make enough to marry, a predicament that threatened to become a self-perpetuating cycle—a man could not make enough to get married, but he would not be paid a high wage until he married (Gerteis 2009, 129-130). Indeed, in addition to a wife, higher wages would also allow the acquisition of a host of consumer products recently arrived on the national scene, and in the minds of many blue-collar men the achievement of manhood had become tantamount to joining the middle class. Despite the narrowing of wage disparities between younger and older men, the rhetorical and material reality appear to have combined to create a wage and status hierarchy that subordinated male blue-collar youth.

Union economist Ōmachi Keisuke thought that there was trouble brewing for the near future. Writing for the labor magazine *Monthly Sōhyō* (*Gekkan Sōhyō*) in 1964, Ōmachi

observed that the wage disparity between men in their twenties and men in their thirties (young and middle-aged) played a significant role in the “graying” of the labor movement. The majority of workers in the rapidly growing communications, transportation, and service sectors were aged twenty-five to thirty, but the average age of union members in those same sectors would soon reach thirty-five. Ōmachi argued that although workers under the age of thirty comprised more than half of the workforce, the rapid economic growth experienced during the preceding decade had facilitated a significant wage disparity between young and middle-aged men that was far worse in Japan than in Western Europe or the United States. Ōmachi warned of dire consequences for Sōhyō if the trend went unaddressed for much longer (Ōmachi 1964, 65-73).

Ōmachi’s article pinpointed a problem that Sōhyō leaders preferred to ignore. Sōhyō unions had won contracts that secured better wages and faster promotion tracking for men in exchange for management schemes that, regardless of skill or ability, systemically relegated women and young men to the lower-paying base of the workforce. Sōhyō unions had agreed to contracts paying younger men and women less as a means of defraying the cost of higher wages for middle-aged men. Young workers, both males and females under the age of thirty, comprised a significantly larger percentage of the waged workforce than unions had on their membership rolls. While the low rates of unionization among young workers resulted from a variety of causes, Ōmachi argued that the significant part of the problem lay with the wage disparity between younger and middle-aged men that underpinned the family wage model advocated by Sōhyō since the mid-1950s.

While union leaders did not at first agree with Ōmachi’s assessment that the “graying” of union membership was an economic problem, the Sōhyō Youth Department nonetheless began to call for improved wages for younger workers, which seemed to result in a slight narrowing of the wage differential between younger and older men. That the average age of Sōhyō members continued to rise (reaching thirty-three in 1970) suggests that despite a narrowed pay differential, Sōhyō unions continued to have a difficult time recruiting young members. Wage and union membership data offer only a glimpse of the economic basis of worker mentality, but it seems likely that the declining numbers of young blue-collar union members was in part the result of an emerging generational rift between blue-collar men.

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クリストファー・ガーティス

イギリス・アメリカで日本について教えること—なぜ外国で日本を勉強するのか？



<配付資料>

2016年11月12日

東京外国語大学 大学院国際日本学研究院主催 連続講演会


クリストファー・ガーティス

イギリス・アメリカで日本について教えること

—なぜ外国で日本を勉強するのか？—



この15年間で、多種多様な大学で日本について教える機会に恵まれました。私はアメリカ人の学者で、生まれも育ちも合衆国ですが、最初に日本へ留学したのは1980年代後半でした。ロンドンで現在のポストに落ち着くまでは、私はそれぞれ性格の異なる6つの大学(小さな人文科学の単科大学から、大きな公立大学まで)で日本について教えていました。




私は2009年からロンドン大学SOASで日本史を教えています。

SOASはとても魅力的な場所です。合計しても学生数は7000名に満たないものの、その半数以上が、世界の様々な大学に留学経験のある大学院生です。ヨーロッパのどこよりもアジア・アフリカ・中東に関するコースをSOASは量的にも密度的にも持っています。

そうしたコースでは、イギリスの学生に教えるだけではありません。実際、私の授業には、日本と同じくらい遠いパキスタンの学生やブルネイの王子などがいます。日本に興味を持つ学生の幅広さにはびっくりします。

そして、とてもユニークですね。

そんな場所はほかにはないことでしょう。こんなにも多種多様な若者が、日本について何かを知りたいと強い関心を持っているような場所は。



SOASの日本研究: 過去

- 1916年、はじめて日本語教育が行われた
- 第二次世界大戦中、軍隊での言語学習を通じて大きな飛躍を遂げる
- 1950年代～60年代の間、歴史学・近現代文学・政治科学の導入でさらなる拡大
- 1970年代～80年代には、経済学と社会学も加わる
- 1990年代以降、カルチュラル・スタディーズに興味を持つ学生が大きく増えたため、新たに人類学やフィルム・テレビ研究を取り入れた


3

SOASの日本研究はまさに尊敬に値する伝統と言えます。

SOASは1916年から(イギリスにおいてはほぼ初となる)日本語教育に携わり、しばらくは唯一の小さなゼミ(常に6人を越えることのない)として続いていましたが、1942年に英国政府が特別奨学金プログラムを始めると、最終的には数百人の男女が日本語を短期集中コースで学び、太平洋戦線に従軍していきました。実際、SOASで訓練を受けた女学生からなる特別部隊は、ブレッチリー・パークの機密暗号解読機関で日本語解読者として従事しました。多くの「ダルウィッチボーイズ」や「ブレッチリーガールズ」は戦後日英間の関係を築きました。

日本語で教育を受ける学生の数は決して多くはありませんでしたが、1950年代から1960年にかけて、SOASは、日本に関するコースを拡大し、歴史学・近現代文学・政治学を新たに学べるようにしました。1970年代から1980年代には日本経済、日本社会学に関するコースも開設されました。

1990年代以降は、人類学やフィルム・テレビ研究といったカルチュラル・スタディーズに興味のある学生が多くを占めるようになりました。



SOASにおける日本研究: 現在

- 2016年、SOASには30人以上の研究者が在籍しており、ヨーロッパでもっとも広い研究分野をカバーしている
- 日本研究のコース:
人類学; 美術・考古学; 演劇研究; 経済学; 地理学; 歴史学; 言語・文学;
法学; メディア研究; 音楽研究; 言語学; 政治学; 宗教・社会学
- 日本語クラスの年間受講者数は、およそ550人
- どの年もSOAS全学生の5人に1人が日本に関する授業を取っている

| 4

2016年現在SOASには30人以上の研究者が在籍しており、ヨーロッパでもっとも広い研究分野をカバーしています。

日本コースで学べる分野は以下の通りです。人類学、美術・考古学、演劇論、経済学、地理学、歴史学、言語・文学、法学、メディア研究、音楽研究、言語学、政治学、宗教・社会学。

日本語クラスの年間受講者数はおよそ550人ですが、SOASでは、上で述べたように、日本に関する幅広いコースがとれるため、全学生の5人に1人が日本に関する授業を毎年受講しています。




日本学を提供している大学

	BA	MA	PhD
United Kingdom	15	15	11
United States	366	299	189

5

日本学はSOASでは大きく力強い存在ですが、英国で日本教育が普及しているとはいえません。全国154もの大学に年間200万人以上の大学生が在籍していますが、その中でたった15のイギリスの大学(10%)にしか日本語もしくは日本語教育の学部はありません。

1845校中366校の大学(20%)が日本学部を持っているアメリカと比べると、あまりにわずかな数ですね。




本日は以下の三つのサブクエスチョンについて考察してみたいと思います。

- 1) アメリカとイギリスの学生は日本について学ぶ時に何を選ぶのか
- 2) なぜ日本を学ぼうとするのか
- 3) 彼らの研究はその後の人生にどう影響を与えるのか

国際交流基金の「日本研究」に関するいくつかの良いデータがあります。それらのデータから、学生と教員の数や、コースで学んだり教えることに対しての鍵が見えてくるでしょう。

ここから先は、国際交流基金によって集められたデータと、イギリスやアメリカにおける私の個人的経験談を織り混ぜて話していくこととします。



まず最も簡単な質問から始めましょう: 日本について何を学んでいるのか？



もちろん、言語を学んでいる


	Secondary		Tertiary		Total
	Total	Prop	Total	Prop	
United States	65,763	0.00021	63,225	0.00020	128,988
United Kingdom	5,624	0.00009	5,615	0.00009	11,239

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
もちろんイギリスの学生もアメリカの学生も日本語を学びます。しかしながら英国と合衆国とでは生徒の数に大きな開きがあります。

高等教育や大学教育を受ける学生の内日本語の授業を選択する数は毎年、合衆国では実に12万8千人を上回るほどですが、英国では1万1千人をわずかに上回るほどでしかありません。

人口の多さで言えば、合衆国の方が英国よりも圧倒的なのは当然ですが、それぞれの国の人口における学生比率を見ても、日本語を学ぶアメリカの学生はイギリスの学生よりも2倍の開きがあります。




言語は日本を理解するにあたって必須のものですが、学生たちは同じように日本の文学や歴史、美術、文化的習慣、経済、政治についても知りたいと思っています。



そして、変遷する学生たちの興味に応じるために、世界各国の大学では(米国と英国においては特に)日本についての授業を行うために、私のような歴史家などの専門家がますます雇われるようになってきました。(部分的に学生への日本語習得の補助もしますが)

1990年代半ば以降ほとんどの日本学部では言語・文学以外の人文科学に重きを置くようになり、その次に社会科学、となっています。

見ればおわりの通り、1995年以降、人文科学の専門家の割合は10%増加しており、法学や公共政策といった特定の専門職に関する専門家の数は目に見えて低下しています(ほぼ6%)。この傾向は研究分野の大きな変化を反映しています。これについては、のちほど触れることにします。




もうすこし詳しく見てみると、日本学科の教員の大多数が歴史/言語/文学を修めているとわかります。

歴史/言語/文学の専門家を合わせると、全体の43%強になります。興味深いのは、この数字は1970年の52%から減少していることですね。というのも、国際交流基金が45年前にこの統計を開始して以来少しずつ進んでいる専門科目の多様化が見て取れるからです。

まあ、私は歴史学が最も優れた学問であると考えていますが、まじめに言って、日本に関する社会科学の占める割合が減少しているのは大きな損失です。単に「需要と供給」という考えから、イギリスやアメリカの学生が社会科学のレンズを通じて日本を研究する機会が減っていくのは残念なことです。

おそらくこのグラフが示すさらに重要なことは、学際的とされる専門家の割合が急増しているということでしょう。このことは、日本に関するどんな知識が大学レベルでアクセスされるのか、という変化を反映しています。これは重要です。



学生の履修状況に目を移してみると、学生たちが多様な科目の中で日本について学んでいることが分かります。

国際交流基金の統計によれば、日本学科のある大学では全歴史科目のうち、7%が日本に焦点を当てていますし、複数国を対象とする歴史科目では4%が日本に関する項目を含んでいます。


一年次で履修する文化・文明概説講座全体では、前者の5%が日本に具体的な焦点を定め、後者でも5%が少なくとも何らかの形で日本を取り上げています。

文化・文明科目は正に私の「ブレッド&バター」(おにぎり)なのです。たとえば「東アジア文明」といった名前のコースをSOASで開講するとなれば、その内30%は「日本」を扱うでしょうし、その場合、この授業で毎年数百人の学生を教えることとなるでしょう。しかし、「日本文明」あるいは「侍の台頭」といったコースを開講したとすると、受講者は20名、多くても50名といった具合になります。もちろん、50名の受講者であっても20~30年続けば大きな数字といえますが、どんな風に見ても、受講生が200名いた方が良いでしょう。


文化・文明概説講座こそ、同僚や私がこの10年にわたって心血を注いでいることなのです。私たちは、日本学の専門家育成に特化せずとも、多岐にわたる学問的視野に立ち、日本に関する項目を幅広い知的土台を広げる手段として取り上げながら、授業を発展させています。

学生が何を学びたいのか、ということは私が教えてきたそれぞれの場所で異なるため、決定的なことを述べるのはとても難しいです。たとえば15年前に小さな教養学部で教えていた時には、私の学生たちの大半が「侍の歴史」コースを履修しており、これは平安時代から徳川幕府の初期にかけての武士階級の台頭を概説するものでした。そのうち半数以上は、私が他に開講していた近代日本史概説も併せて履修していました。こちらの授業では徳川家康の台頭から第二次世界大戦の終戦までが対象でした。

しかし、もう少し最近の話となると、学生の反応は異なります。たとえばロンドン大学SOASでは私の学生たちは「侍の歴史」には実質的に興味をほとんど示さず、主に関心を示すのは近現代日本に関する科目のみです。実のところ、学部においては、近代日本を扱う私の授業はここずっと2番目に受講者数の多い授業となっており、大学院においては、私の授業は最大の受講者数となります。近代中国や近代中東を扱う授業よりも大きいのですよ。



ただ、なぜ学生たちが私たちの授業へやってくるのでしょうか。これは非常に難しい問題です。しかし、社会学者であるパトリシア・スタインホフ(ハワイ大学)がまとめた素晴らしい研究から、この問いにとって極めて有益な洞察がもたらされるでしょう。



国際交流基金の支援を受けて、パトリシア・スタインホフは1970年代以来長期的(縦断的)な日本研究の調査研究を行っています。


スタインホフのデータは、合衆国内で日本に関する指導、調査、研究を行っているほぼ全ての人々への調査から成っています。また、彼女が行った調査方法は、英国やオーストラリアにおける同様のデータ収集方法へ影響を与えました。

学生の履修に関するスタインホフのデータによって明らかになったのは、これまで一般的には裏付けが乏しいとされていたことでした。

実際彼女はそのデータを用いることで、アメリカにおいて1970年代から現れた(実際には1950年代にまで遡れそうな)学生の関心について、明確な3つの枠組み(傾向)を見出しています。

英国のデータはもちろんオーストラリアのデータでさえ、この素晴らしさには及びませんが、彼女が合衆国について下した結論は、イギリスやオーストラリアの状況と重なっているように見えます。

スタインホフが発見したのは、1980年以前においては日本学を研究する学生の大半は言語や地域研究に関心を寄せていたということ、それから1980年代以後には日本との経済競争をする中で日本に関する新しいタイプの知識を求める学生が一気に増えたということでした(バブル経済が終わって日本経済は衰退していくわけですが)。こうした2つの流れのあとで台頭してきたものが、意外にも日本のカルチュラル・スタディーズだったのです。



・日本研究への2つの道程:

- a) 古典文化への接触
- b) 兵役

・様々な学問を通して日本を見つめるよう学ぶため、人文科学と社会科学の間で均等に分散する。

・日本研究を履修する学生が少数である。


・言語ならびに学問的な専門性が高い水準で獲得される。



- 経済的に有益なものとして学生が日本研究に取り組むようになった。
- 学生が、実利的に必要な知識の獲得を望む。
- 社会科学や専門職志向のトレーニング。
- 短期間に学生が増えた。
- 言語や社会科学の専門性が高い水準で獲得される。



- ・学生達は言語研究とは別に、学際的な科目を通じた研究を望む。日本語研究は前提条件ではなくなる。
- ・サブカルチャーやポップカルチャーが、研究のキー・テーマとなり、動機となる。
- ・臨機応変に対応できる人文科学の併用が重視される。
- ・社会科学の重視が薄れる。
- ・3つの枠組みの中で最も学生が多い。
- ・言語習熟度は個人差が激しい。
- ・学問分野としての専門性が低くなった。



スタインホフのデータは魅力的ですが、日本研究が学生のその後の人生にどのような影響をもたらすのかという問いへの答えは持ちあわせてはいません。それでも、私の実体験に基づき、いくつかの考察を試みようと思います。



幾分かありふれたことではありますが、外国人が留学生として日本で築く人間関係は、一生継続ということを挙げておきます。私たちが日本で結ぶ関係に何の価値があるわけではありません。にもかかわらず、他国民との関係にはこれが重要なのです。



高い生涯賃金

The Telegraph

8 Oct 2012

Graduate jobs: Top 10 degree subjects by lifetime salary



10. Japanese studies

Average lifetime salary: £36,437

Japanese was ranked as one of the top 10 foreign languages to study in a recent survey of UK employers' preferences. Those students who enrol in degree courses studying the language, as well as Japanese culture and literature, also perform extremely well on lifetime salary, averaging £36,437 from graduation through to the age of 65.

Perhaps surprisingly, this puts Japanese studies well ahead of subjects so far on the list such as Law, which ranks 37th among degree subjects by lifetime salary – only 46 per cent of law grads will go on to become highly paid lawyers.

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ただし、日本研究には経済的な理由も伴っています。

イギリスの日報『テレグラフ』が英国労働者を調査して大学卒業者の生涯賃金を計算した2012年のデータを発表しました。正直なところ、次のことには驚きました。日本語研究や日本研究をしている学生は平均生涯賃金で第10位となり、法学位所持者よりも高かったのです！

英国では日本専攻の卒業生はそう多くありませんが、時間と努力を日本研究に費やした学生たちは、ほとんど他の学位所持者よりも高収入を得るチャンスがあるのです。

アメリカでも同じ傾向がありますが、上位10番以内ということはありません！



驚かないで欲しいのですが、日本は世界への入り口なのです。日本はいかにして国際化すべきか、という声をよく耳にしますが、重要なのは、日本が国外の多くの学生にとって世界につながる道になっているのだと理解することです。

事実、日本に関して研究すること、日本に留学することというのは、アメリカやイギリスからやってくる若い人びとにとって、数え切れないほどの機会に恵まれているということになります。

JETや東京外国語大学などが参加している交換プログラムといったものなどは、日本への重要な入り口となっていますが、SOASの日本研究課程を修了した若者の中には、日本とは、まったく関係のない分野で成功している者も多くいます。

私がかつて教えたある学生は、現在ロンドン市警の巡査部長を務めています。NHKに務めている学生も、スーダンの難民キャンプで働いて帰国したばかりの学生もいます。

日本を研究するということは、イギリスやアメリカの学生にとって現実的な選択肢なのです。それは日本の専門家が必要とされているからではなく、日本について学ぶ過程は、学生たちにとって、いま私たちが暮らしている世界に関わっていく上で必要なツールを確立する手助けとなるからです。

編集後記

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東京外国語大学へ特別招へい教授として以下を担当した (2016年9月1日～2017年7月20日)

2016年秋学期 Japanese Modernity I

2016年冬学期 CAAS&NINJAL ユニット合同セミナー内

"Uneven Development: Industrialization and Colonization in East Asia"

2017年春学期 Contemporary Japan: A Brief History

特別講演会として以下を開いた

2016年11月12日「イギリス・アメリカで日本について教えることーなぜ外国で日本を勉強するのか？」

特別講演会として以下を企画した

2017年6月8日 HIPHOP 研究会

2017年6月14日「サウダーヂ」上映会

東京外国語大学 国際日本学研究所 報告Ⅱ

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Christopher Gerteis (SOAS, University of London) in TUFs, 2016-17

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
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